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CLD-273        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1514 
___________ 
 
TOM FRANKLIN, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
GMAC MORTGAGE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:13-cv-00171) 
District Judge:  Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and  
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 6, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: June 21, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Tom Franklin appeals pro se from the District Court‟s order dismissing his petition 
for declaratory judgment.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court‟s order. 
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I. 
In January 2013, Appellant Tom Franklin filed a pro se petition for declaratory 
judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against 
GMAC Mortgage, which was subsequently transferred by order of that court to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In Franklin‟s petition, he disputed a debt owed to 
GMAC on Franklin‟s Fort Worth, Texas property, and asserted that GMAC is not 
permitted to foreclose on the property due to the application of two Georgia statutes, Ga. 
Code Ann. § 23-2-114 and § 51-1-8.  Franklin also asserted that GMAC violated the 
federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), by its 
failure to validate the underlying debt.  Franklin sought a stay of the foreclosure 
proceedings and $10,000,000 in damages. 
On February 6, 2013, the District Court entered an order dismissing Franklin‟s 
petition with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  In its memorandum, 
the District Court noted that Franklin provided no factual support to establish that GMAC 
violated any law, nor did Franklin provide any basis to conclude that Georgia law applied 
to the mortgage on his property.  The District Court further noted that neither injunctive 
relief nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the FDCPA.  The 
District Court‟s order provided Franklin thirty days to amend his complaint.  Instead, 
Franklin timely appealed to this Court and submitted a brief in support of his appeal. 
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II. 
As Franklin has chosen not to amend his petition per the District Court‟s order, 
and instead has sought to appeal its dismissal, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal of the 
complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 
851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Pleadings 
and other submissions by pro se litigants are subject to liberal construction, and we are 
required to accept the truth of Franklin‟s well-pleaded factual allegations while drawing 
reasonable inferences in his favor.  See Higgs v. Att‟y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2011); Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  
However, a pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”‟ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We 
may summarily affirm a judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the 
record if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  See I.O.P. 10.6; see also 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
The District Court correctly dismissed Franklin‟s petition due to Franklin‟s failure 
to state a claim.  As noted by the District Court, Franklin‟s conclusory assertions that 
GMAC‟s foreclosure violated Georgia law, without providing any factual support to 
justify the imposition of Georgia law, is insufficient to state a claim.  See Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).  Additionally, as noted by the 
District Court, Franklin is not entitled to injunctive relief under the FDCPA, see Weiss v. 
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Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2004), and has also failed to establish or 
provide any factual support for his conclusory allegation that GMAC is a “debt collector” 
within the meaning of the FDCPA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).   
As Franklin‟s petition does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim, 
the District Court correctly dismissed his petition.
1
  Accordingly, this appeal presents us 
with no substantial question, and we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  
See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                              
1
 Franklin‟s brief in support of his appeal does not address any of the District Court‟s 
concerns, but rather asserts that the District Court was biased and that his petition should 
not have been dismissed unless it was clear that the facts asserted, assumed to be true, 
failed to support a claim for relief.  As there is no evidence of bias on the part of the 
District Court, and as this Court finds that Franklin‟s petition has not met the standard set 
forth by Iqbal, his petition was properly dismissed.      
